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Abstract
Many public controversies involve the assessment of statements about which we have imperfect
information. Without a structured approach, it is quite difficult to develop an approach to reasoning
which is not based on ad hoc choices. Forms of logic have been used in the past to try to bring
such clarity, but these fail for a variety of reasons. We demonstrate a simple approach to bringing
a standardized approach to semantics, in uncertain discourse, using Promise Theory. As a case, we
use Promise Theory (PT) to collect and structure publicly available information about the case of the
MCAS software component for the Boeing 737 Max flight control system.
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1 Introduction
The tragic crashes of two Boeing 737 Max aircraft led to the grounding of the worldwide fleet and an
extensive investigation into the causes. The flight safety of the aircraft design, including its software, has
been called into question, centering on a software component known as the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System (MCAS).
In this paper, we present some initial considerations concerning the discussion surrounding the ways
in which faults and flaws may have entered the aircraft’s human-machine system1. Software engineering
safety, in particular, is a subject in rapid flux, given the pace of software development. It began, in earnest,
with the informal definition of failure modes [2], and was extended principally through discussions of
specific technologies and their security properties. More recently, methodology concerning ‘post-mortem
analysis’ of incidents and systemic learning has been developed [3–5]. More generally, system safety—
with an emphasis on flight safety—has a long history and an extensive literature (see for example [6–9]),
and has been related to the wider concept of systematic stability [1, 10, 11], but the tools of analysis are
largely informal and heuristic, so there is considerable room for more constrained languages for analytic
reasoning. Introducing some aspects of Promise Theory as a tool for such analysis is one goal of this
work.
Software plays a role in nearly all complex systems today. Increasingly, the focus rests on ‘algorithms’—
where the term ‘algorithm’ enshrines a bundle of design decisions on how a system is supposed to react
under certain conditions. An algorithm is (perhaps boldly and certainly informally) said to ‘determine’
the decisions made by the system in different circumstances; but algorithms are logical trees of possi-
ble pathways—they may also make use of data gathered in real time or from experience, by learning
techniques. We will return to the notion of an algorithm in the concluding section.
The suggestion of determinism therefore overstates the capabilities of algorithms. All we can really
say is that their promises influence outcomes in some fashion. The more recent discussions concern-
ing the use of machine learning, say for self-driving vehicles [12, 13], illustrates how there is often a
mismatch of complexities in reliance in software algorithms. When notable failures occur, certain sys-
tem components, including software components, may become the subject of intense public debates,
conducted at a high level of abstraction, and thus far removed from technical realities.
In this work, we base our analysis on the following assumptions:
• Algorithms, and the software components realizing them, are subjects for public deliberation,
reflection, and scrutiny. We refer to this as the external assessment of algorithms and software
components.
• The language and notations of computer science, and of engineering, are often too technical and
too detailed for use by the public at large, i.e. for informal external assessments. Moreover, the
strict forms of logic are unhelpful in analyzing problems of non-trivial complexity. Some middle
ground is helpful.
• Promise Theory is a useful tool for the assessment of algorithms and software components, because
it offers a semi-formal approach based on a clear model of interaction, with a decade of experience
and application [1, 11]. It’s our goal to pursue this avenue through the Boeing case study.
Promise Theory was originally conceived as an approach to modelling in agent-based systems, i.e. in
systems composed from independent components, as networks, from the bottom up. PT exposes the role
of agent interactions, both semantically and dynamically. Although originally applied in the context of
distributed computer systems, the method is general and has since been applied at larger scales and even
social and political contexts. It includes the possibility of interactions between human and non-human
agents, and the effects of the fidelity with which agents are able to keep promises that may be offered at
varying levels of precision [14].
1Faults refer to components that are unable to keep their promises, while flaws are promises that were inappropriately
incommensurate with their intended goals [1].
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Promise Theory breaks the world broadly into agents, promises, and assessments. An agent may
be any separable entity, i.e. one that has the capacity to inject independent causal information to the
system. A promise is a statement of intent, and can be made by single agents or by groups of agents
(superagents). Promises typically fall into two types: behaviours offered (sometimes called + promises)
and behaviours accepted (sometimes called - promises). The description of what constitutes a promise
may be specified in any language, in principle, but the more precise an offer is made, the easier it is for
it to be accepted and assessed. An assessment, on the other hand, is a statement of the belief made by an
agent about whether a promise (made by any other agent, or itself) has been kept or not. By breaking a
system down into these parts, PT offers a surprisingly clear picture of system completeness, which is not
dogged the excessive constraints of formal logics.
In this work we try to find an appropriate scale and language for describing the human-machine
collaboration involved in a flight system: promises are used to inform agents at all levels: machine to
machine, machine to human, human to machine, and system to external observers, who may be either
technical or non-technical. We focus on the catastrophic losses of two Boeing 737 Max flights as a case
study, and we develop a promise theoretic analysis suitable for an external assessment of the MCAS
component of Boeing 737 Max flight control software. External assessments may range from design
choices to implementation artifacts, and their roles during flights. This should include the concept of
ongoing development, including updates to components, which is common in software engineering in
particular.
1.1 Promise Theory and modes of application
Promise Theory can be used in a variety of ways. In this paper we use it as a tool for structuring
information, in the public discussion, which has mainly concerned the requirements of certain software
components. Lacking the undisclosed ‘inside information’ of the investigation, as most commentators
do, we must be careful not to make unsubstantiated claims. PT is helpful, nevertheless, in sorting out
claims and context where varied assessments comes into play.
The first hint that PT can be useful is the following inequality in treatment of systems. The term
‘system requirements’ is most commonly used in engineering methodology when complicated machin-
ery and human systems are discussed and designed, In other words, requirements and expectations are
imposed rather than stating what tolerances the resulting implementations are able to deliver. This focus
on requirement is supposed to ensure their fitness for purpose. By contrast, simpler off-the-shelf com-
ponents are described by their tolerances (effectively stating the limits of what they promise, rather than
what an independent party requires of them).
According to Promise Theory, requirements have the status of ‘impositions’—i.e. an external pres-
sure exerted on a system or its builders to accept and implement certain directives and to promises com-
mensurate with them in response. Multiple requirements, i.e. multiple impositions can be inconsistent
and lead to uncertainty, so it’s always better to flip the discussion around to what promises components
can make independently, and then study the interactions of those promises [14]. That will be our strategy
here. Regardless of the process used to form expectations about the behaviour of system components,
we choose to draw attention to what they are able to promise, rather than what others may seek to require
of them.
In order to illustrate and clarify the available degrees of freedom when working with PT, we distin-
guish five modes of application:
Political strategy level (PAL). PT used to express long term policies, independent of individual action
or preference. Here promisers and promisees are humans.
Tactical political level (PAL). PT used to discuss the behaviour of individuals and groups in elation to
specific objectives. Here promisers and promisees are humans and social groups.
Software requirements assessment level (SRAL) PT used to discuss and reflect on the role that soft-
ware components play in a specific context, for instance whether or not a specific software com-
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ponent, say in control of the aircraft, allows enough Meaningful Human Control (MHC), see for
instance [15, 16] and [17]) over the actions of the total system.
Technical interaction theory level (PAL) PT used as a framework for the description and development
of theoretical accounts of multi-agent systems (e.g. [18]).
Software technology level (PAL). PT is used to specify the intended behaviour of software compo-
nents2.
Generally speaking, promises explain the envelope of system behaviour, in the form of pre-specified
outcomes and language—applied to the many software components and combinations inside systems.
The great bonus of using PT is that it can easily unify the roles of different kinds of agent—both human
and non-human—in a single framework.
2 A litany of explicit and supposed promises by agents involved
We begin without further delay to describe some of the promises made by the Boeing aircraft system and
its manufacturer. The key promises set the scene, principally from the perspective of each promiser. Here
they form the basis on which to asses the MCAS software component. Each promise has the following
structure:
Promiser Agent ‘body’−−−→
Scope
Promisee Agent (1)
where the body of the promise represents an explication of the intended outcome, and the scope is a list
of agents who are privy to the promise between the promiser and promisee.
3 The main agents referred to
Agents will be written in bold face, and include:
• Boeing management (Boeing)
• Airline management
• Pilots
• FAA, i.e. the Federal Aviation Authority.
• Authors, i.e. us.
• Public, i.e. the audience for public discourse.
• Ralph Nader, political activist and consumer advocate.
• W. Bradley Wendel Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell Univer-
sity.
• Peter Ladkin Professor of Computer Networks and Distributed Systems in the Faculty of Tech-
nology at the University of Bielefeld.
• Benno Baksteen Captain and former president of the Dutch Airline Pilots’ Association.
• DO178c Software Engineering standards.
2Promise Theory emerged from the study of stability and formal correctness of system states in computer installations as a
deviation from the over-constraints of logical reasoning towards network processes [19–22].
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Figure 1: The promises directed between agents. The public is a superagent containing all the others. Most agents
direct their promises publicly, but a few a solely kept within the aerospace industry. There is a non-transparent
boundary to which the general public is not privy.
3.1 Boeing as the promiser
Three promises from Boeing’s side communicate an awareness of what is at stake. The most central
and stark promise was that of continuity in system behaviour between the longstanding 737 and the
revitalized 737 Max.
Promise 3.1 (Model continuity promise)
From Boeing management (promiser) to Airline management (promisee) with Pilots in scope:
PROMISE BODY:
(i) For a pilot used to a B737 NG, the B737 Max flies like B737 NG,
(ii) No face to face retraining courses are needed for Pilots upgrading to the Max,
(iii) No simulator training is needed for Pilot conversion either,
(iv) Pilots can fly B737 NG and B737 Max (interchangeably),
(v) Certification of B737 Max is done, as it is the same type of B737 NG.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.2 (MCAS hidden existence promise)
From Boeing to FAA (with no Airlines or pilots in scope, only selected Boeing engineers and FAA
specialists in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
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(i) The MCAS software component (new in the B737 Max) takes care of aerodynamic differences in
behaviour between B737 NG and B737 Max by giving additional stabilizer trim commands under
certain conditions,
(ii) MCAS operates in such a manner that a Pilot need not even know about the existence of MCAS,
and therefore need not know how it works either.
(iii) Even if it is detected that the Angle of Attack (AoA) sensors disagree, that information need not be
communicated as a warning to the pilots (although this warning signal can be bought at additional
costs). For Pilots who do not know of the existence of MCAS such information is of no use, and
increases the risk of information overload in the cockpit.
END PROMISE
Item (iii) above is confirmed in [23] where it is considered a plausible design decision, and is men-
tioned in [24] where it is considered an implausible design decision.
Promise 3.3 (Non-antistall promise)
Boeing to FAA (no-one else in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
(i) MCAS is merely installed in order to have the same flight experience for pilots,
(ii) MCAS is not meant to prevent stalling or any other potential calamitous emergency which has
become more probable in the B737 Max compared with the B737 NG because of aerodynamic
differences (which result from different size and placement of the engines).
(iii) MCAS is based on existing technology that is properly working in the Boeing KC-46 Pegasus
tanker plane, which is a further development of a Boeing 767 cc).
END PROMISE
We might note that such a promise may immediately be suspected as a deception, since promising that
the addition of a software component meant to counter the effects of mechanical changes would have no
effect on stalling is implausible in and of itself.
3.2 Authors as promisers
The following are some promises that we, the authors, provide for the benefit of the reader (you), for
context and reference. The promises in this section are of general methodological interest as a reasoning
tool. They point to one advantage of PT over a precise logical argument, and over free rhetoric: without
PT, when stating the promise bodies as factual information, there is a need to find evidence in support of
the assertions. Logical statements should be considered true or false—perhaps with some probability.
Remarkably, with promises, one can do without providing evidence, as long as the claims are not
beyond reason, because the implicit semantics are sufficient for the purpose of establishing a the positions
semantically. This is in contrast to logical approaches, where actual evidential inputs are needed to
establish branch points in an argument, else one faces an exponential growth of brittle and mutually
exclusive possibilities. With PT, on the other hand, a reader who disagrees with an agent’s promises
(e.g. is able to find a convincing rationale for the existence of a software component MCAS-p in the
Boeing KC-46 Pegasus) could simply decrease their trust in that agent—as you, the reader, might decide
that we—the authors of this document—are untrustworthy, if we should make promises that violate your
perceived trust. Indeed, this is generally true—we may have failed to find crucial evidence, which we
accept, but that is not a reason to abstain from trying to make sense of what we can discover. Others may
offer flawed evidence, which could lead to more trust than is warranted.
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Promise 3.4 (Existing technology questionability promise.)
Authors to Public readers:
PROMISE BODY:
(i) By MCAS-p, we refer to the MCAS-like software component developed for the Boeing KC-46
Pegasus,
(ii) There is no information easily and publicly available which explains what the role of MCAS-p is
or is intended to be in the Boeing KC-46 Pegasus flight control system.
(iii) It is implausible that MCAS-p only serves to create a look and feel for pilots which conforms to a
type which they have been flying before (as mentioned above).
(iv) It is hard to find out (and we did not succeed in determining) which objectives of MCAS-p have
been preserved as the objectives of MCAS, which objectives were dropped, and which new objec-
tives were assigned to MCAS w.r.t. MCAS-p.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.5 Authors to Public readers (i.e. Public in scope).
PROMISE BODY:
The B737 Max problem may be considered a software problem, if only because its solution
(according to Boeing) consists of an upgrade of the MCAS software component.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.6 Authors to Public readers (i.e. Public in scope).
PROMISE BODY:
The B737 Max software problem may be considered an instance of feature interaction, i.e.
promises that are conditional on one another (See e.g. [25] for the concept of feature inter-
actions.)
END PROMISE
To justify promise 3.6 we mention that the following features interacted during the calamitous events:
1. Repeated automatic stabilizer downwards trimming upon detection of excessive angle of attack,
and independently of pilot’s attempts to override the stabilizer trimming commands. This situation
was described in detail w.r.t. the Lion Air crash in [26] (a key feature introduced after the Airbus
earlier 330 crash over the Atlantic, where it became clear that pilot’s failed to believe that the
aircraft was at risk to enter a stall. This suggestion has been put forward in detail in [23].).
2. The immediate predecessor aircraft model (737 NG) allows Pilots to counteract runaway trim3 via
yoke handling (although the flight manual instructs not to do so, and instead proposes (i) apply
the manual switch off of the electric motors which move the trim, and (ii) thereafter use manual
3‘Runaway trim occurs when the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) or other trim device on the aircraft tail fails to stop
at the desired position and continues to deflect up or down. Runaway trim can have several causes, including but not limited to
a bad switch, a short circuit, or a software failure.’ [27]
7
control until safe landing, (while 737 Max 8 technically only allows the second solution of a trim
runaway).
(The 737 Max design made it a feature that the instructions in the flight manual were the unique
and only way to solve the problem. Thereby a parasitic feature, inherited from the 737 NG, was
overridden and the need for training to undo habits that contradicted flight manual prescriptions
went undetected. Recent information suggests that not following flight manuals is still standard
practice to date. See [23] for more detail.)
3. MCAS is triggered (to change the stabilizer position by several degrees, in order to make the
aircraft turn in a downward direction) by a single AOA sensor, even though a second AOA sensor
produces highly deviating values, and even if the system has observed that AOA measurements
have become unreliable4.
(This might be arguably ok in terms of probability calculus, and even preferable to voting with two
AOA sensors, as long as the risk of trimming the stabilizer when that is not required was negligible,
that is when trigger by a faulty AOA sensor is manageable. However, it exposed a critical failure
path.)
4. If runaway trim is detected too late and the move towards fully manual flying has been made, it
may be too heavy going for the pilots to use the manual stabilizer control in order to counteract
the trim runaway.
(Acquiring effective manual control is not so easy as might be expected. Those pilots who have
had hands on experience with manual control in the 737 NG under demanding circumstances
found that effectuating manual control became slightly harder in the 737 Max. Indeed manual
stabilizer controls now have a slightly smaller radius than in the predecessor model, a feature
which saves cockpit space, but which may require more human power and which for that reason
may be problematic at higher speeds. High speed is likely to occur after a stabilizer runaway has
been detected and reacted upon late.)
5. Hiding from the pilots the information that both AOA sensors disagree (a feature intended to avoid
cognitive overload, in a critical phase, was justified by the observation that the AOA is not a
quantity on which the human control of a commercial airliner is based nowadays).
(In the 737 Max case, knowing that AOA sensors diverge in their readings, and that AOA measure-
ment is unreliable for that reason is of no help whatsoever for the Pilots, unless the Pilots know
that this may negatively impact on MCAS behaviour. Therefore suppressing this information was
deemed a reasonable feature in the light of information overload prevention.)
6. The role of simulators has been complex. Simulator tests during development missed the scenario
of the Lion Air accident, which upon retrospectively analyzing the accident could be replicated and
led to the conclusion that repeated MCAS interventions in addition to other warnings indirectly
caused by AOA disagreement increased the workload for the Pilots too much (see [28]). Simulator
tests after redesign of the B737 Max has shown anew complications which too months to resolve
(see [29]). B737 Max Pilots had only been using B737 NG simulators for training which don’t
contain the MCAS software, or an appropriate abstraction of it. B737 Max simulators exist, but
without MCAS simulation.5
Promise 3.7 (Contemplating the hypothetical B737 Max-minus)
Authors to Public readers (Public in scope).
4Readers may note that a promise theoretic analysis of the flight system, at the deeper software level, would have revealed
this as an immediate red flag, when two agents promise data, yet only one agent’s data was accepted. A simple count of + and
- promises would have revealed the design flaw.
5CockpitMax.com advertises a B737 Max simulator which does not mention MCAS as one of the simulated flight control
software components.
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PROMISE BODY:
(i) By a hypothetical B737 Max-minus, let us imagine an aircraft B737 Max without MCAS, i.e the
airplane B737 Max modified in such a manner that “AOA too high” alerts are not processed, so
that no interventions from MCAS may occur.
(ii) From the publicly available literature one cannot infer whether or not B737 Max-minus can be
certified as a new type of aircraft. However, promise 3.3 suggests that this would indeed be possi-
ble.
(iii) It is an open theoretical problem whether or not a software component MCASb exists (in a mathe-
matical sense, i.e. can be designed) which transforms B737 Max-minus, which is referred to as the
unaugmented B737 Max [30] by including MCASb, to an aircraft B737 Max (MCASb) which can
be successfully certified as an airplane of the same type as B737 NG. This problem is decidable,
in principle, by assuming that an airframe will be used not more that a predetermined maximum
of hours, and that it suffices to recompute all desired outputs, say every millisecond.
(iv) The principal conceptual problem for the design of MCASb is whether or not it allows meaningful
human (i.e. pilot) control (MHC) in all stages of the flight.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.8 (Rationale for the use of a single AOA sensor)
Authors to Public readers (public in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
(i) If it turns out to be the case that MCAS-p (see promise 3.4) has been designed as an anti-stall
system, then the use of input from a single AOA sensor is only plausible (in hindsight).
(ii) If MCAS results from a natural evolution of predecessor MCAS-p, then the use of a single AOA
sensor output is plausible in hindsight (while at the same time it indicates a mismatch between
high level requirement of making the B737 Max fly like a B737 NG, and low level requirements i.e.
inheriting anti-stall functionality from MCAS-p.
END PROMISE
This concludes the assertions that we infer from literature surrounding the incident. Readers should
assess each of these promised statements in the light of their possibly greater access to information.
3.3 Other external observers as promisers
Finally, conducive to the argument of software flaws, let us consider some more points.
Promise 3.9 (False alarm.)
Benno Baksteen to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
(i) There is no problem with B737 Max at this moment (March 13 2019) [31].
(ii) The step to ground B737 Max aircraft in China is overly cautious and is not well-founded in facts.
END PROMISE
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Our assessment: this promise turned out to be impossible to keep upright, and thereby sets and end
to the trust we have in Benno Baksteen as an aviation safety expert.
Promise 3.10 (MCAS is a patch which provides stability and anti stall protection).
Ralph Nader to Public (all Public in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
(i) MCAS is a software patch which compensates for aerodynamic design problems (labelled as in-
stability).
(ii) These difficulties should have been solved by airframe design and not by means of a software
patch, i.e. a mechanical solution to a mechanical problem.
END PROMISE
This promise we construct as made by Nader from the following quote [32]:
‘And the light at the end of the tunnel is not trying to use a hoked-up, glitch-ridden software
in the cockpit—MCAS, it’s called. A software fix for hardware defect? You’ve got to recall
the planes, and Boeing has got to develop engineering adjustments and engineering changes
so that plane is not prone to stall, which is, of course, what led to the crashes in Indonesia
and Ethiopia, killing of 346 innocent people. That’s where it’s got to be now.’
This promise seems to build on the following implicit promise, which we infer (by imputing from
the quote):
Promise 3.11 Ralph Nader to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
I am knowledgeable about the principles of designing aircraft, and about which problems
should and should not be solved by means of (novel) flight control software.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.12 (Fundamental solution promise)
Ralph Nader to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
Existing B737 Max planes are best taken back by Boeing for adjustment so as to work well
without an additional software patch.
END PROMISE
This promise is implicit in the same quote and it seems to presuppose the following promise:
Promise 3.13 Ralph Nader to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
As an expert in building airplanes I can assure you that it is possible to fix the airframe, by
way of aerodynamically relevant adjustments in such a manner that no additional control
software component (like MCAS) will be needed.
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END PROMISE
How one assesses Nader’s comments here, in the form of promises, is of significance to his credibility
as a commentator—just as our comments above are about us. Assessing them as incorrect could suggest
that Nader’s objective was to create reputational damage for Boeing rather than to offer a safe solution to
the flight control issue. Remarks by law professor W. Bradley Wendel, which we paraphrase from [23]
is more accommodating to possible solutions:
Promise 3.14 W. Bradley Wendel to Public readers (Public in scope)
PROMISE BODY:
If one contemplates holding Boeing accountable for the problematic design of B737 Max
aircraft, then the best approach would be to propose a Rational Alternative Design (RAD)—
that is a design modification which has the following properties: (i) when implemented
it prevents the problems which have occurred from occurring, (ii) the alternative can be
proposed by persons with ordinary professional knowledge, (iii) the alternative functions
properly in all relevant circumstances.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.15 W. Bradley Wendel suggests to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
Rational Alternative Design (RAD) requires that both AOA sensors agree when triggering
MCAS in an intervention (thereby avoiding that the single AOA sensor operates as a Single
Point of Failure).
END PROMISE
For this matter see [23]. As a side comment, we mention that [23] takes it for granted that MCAS
primarily provides anti-stall protection (which is in contrast with promise 3.3). That being the case
(hypothetically) a false negative (failing to see that the AOA has become too high) presents a high risk.
Now requiring that both AOA sensors agree increases the probability of false negatives. This observation
has lead us to promise 3.8 above.
Software commentator P. Ladkin takes issue with the assertion of anti-stall intent, and indicates that
he has no conclusive evidence that software engineers made relevant mistakes, mainly because spotting
system design flaws is not their responsibility [33].
Promise 3.16 Peter Ladkin to Public (Public in scope).
PROMISE BODY:
Even if a software update solves the B737 Max problems, there is no reason to assume that
the original software engineers made mistakes.
END PROMISE
Ladkin points to an issue which is central to the matter: only once it is known what the software
component is supposed to achieve in principle its engineering can be criticized.
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4 Secondary promises (by Boeing, FAA)
Boeing issued a communication to the press which indicated direction in which the problems would be
solved.
Promise 4.1 From Boeing to FAA (Public in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
Some improvements and adjustments will be made (leaving the airframe unchanged) on the
design in order to have it once more certified (with in the same type as the B737 NG):
(i) There will be a warning for the pilots if AOA (angle of attack) sensors disagree (beyond
5.5 degrees).
(ii) Upon detection of a AOA disagreement MCAS-next will be deactivated, and at the same
time pilots must work with manual control.
(iii) MCAS-next will not repeat its interventions.
(iv) MCAS-next will take notice of pilot actions and repeated attempts to overrule MCAS
interventions will be successful.
END PROMISE
The final promise of software learning the pilots’ behaviours throws up new warning flags from a design
perspective—namely, the extent to which Pilots can rely on software or hardware control then becomes
completely unknown.
Promise 4.2 From Boeing to FAA (Public in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
(i) We have proposed adjustments which justify certification before the end of 2019. Prototype air-
planes are operational and have made many test flights.
(Notice that the expectation of certification by a deadline is an imposition, which is likely without
merit.)
(ii) A high level simulator is available and in this simulator the improved B737 Max design passes all
relevant tests.
END PROMISE
Promise 4.3 From FAA to Boeing (Public in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
Certification of the improved B737 Max will not take place during 2019, and the timing of
this action is entirely up to the FAA.
END PROMISE
For an outsider comment on the the latter promise we mention [34].
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5 Secondary promises by the authors
Let us try to capture part of ‘what went wrong’, using a bundle of promises. By using promises explicitly,
readers may know clearly our intended meaning, whereas in looser narrative form the points might be
dismissed as rhetoric. None of what follows should be read as a claim that Boeing engineers were sloppy
or negligent. Their engineering challenge was spectacular, though perhaps more so in hindsight than
at the time of B737 Max flight control software design. Indeed, it may be fairly difficult to find out
when and where in the development process steps were taken which could be qualified as defective or
problematic.
We assume, in the following, that the B737 Max design is (at least to some extent) responsible for
both accidents, granted any claims that pilot errors, maintenance problems, and training deficiencies may
have been in place as well. This seems fair, since one must assess the total system and the fidelity of all
agents in keeping their component promises in promising the outcome of the whole [1].
Promise 5.1 (Learning curve risks persist)
Authors to Public.
PROMISE BODY:
(i) Both catastrophes will in due time be understood as having played an important role in the learning
curve of aircraft design. The idea that deadly catastrophes can be prevented is too optimistic.
(ii) Rather than a focus on which redesign of the B737 Max provides the simplest way out of these
difficulties, the essential question is: in what way are these problems informative about weaknesses
of the DO178c software engineering standards (see e.g. [35]).
(iii) Software engineering may need to take more responsibility of that rationale of requirements and
specifications. The focus of DO178c on testing protocols may distract from the promised require-
ments capture and management at higher levels of system design. Clearly no amount of classical
software testing could have prevented the MCAS requirements from being insufficiently flexible to
deal with that variation of in-flight problems that may occur, without a meta criterion for finding
the failure modes6.
END PROMISE
Promise 5.2 (Metapromise of B737 maturity.)
The Authors promise to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
Implicit promises, from Boeing management and Staff were made to Airlines and Pilots
concerning the B737:
(i) The B737 NG is a fully mature design with a very good safety track record. It con-
stitutes the current endpoint of the most successful development line of commercial
jetliners. The B737 constitutes the pinnacle of airframe reliability.
(ii) Just as the A320 had to be adapted to new engines, a development process which
Airbus has carried out in recent years, the B737 deserved for a new engine option,
while using the very successful B737 (NG) airframe.
6We believe that a promise theoretic methodology could have been of use here, if applies at the level of system engineering,
as mentioned earlier, but this topic goes beyond the scope of this note.
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(iii) All safety systems inside the B737 have been developed into full maturity, and have
proven to work well in countless circumstances, and can therefore be relied upon when
adapting the design.
END PROMISE
Note that this latter promise is a promise about another set of promises. These have been inferred by
us, and the proposed promisers might not have made these exactly as stated. Promising on behalf of
other agents is a common phenomenon, but it may be flagged in PT as a violation. Agents cannot make
promises on behalf of other agents, as they are not in possession of their private knowledge or capabilities.
Readers may take this into account in such instances of public discourse. Some further observations:
Promise 5.3 (The manual trim wheel as an emerging risk factor.)
Authors to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
(i) Boeing management and engineers have failed to notice that during the years of development the
trim wheel has become a less understood part of the B737 design, mainly because the problem it
is supposed to solve, viz. a stabilizer runaway, has become so rare due to advances in motorized
control technology technology for movable parts of wings and rudders.
(ii) Upon the introduction of MCAS, a novel scenario for a problem which is similar to but not identical
to a classical stabilizer runaway, has arisen—but that went somehow unnoticed.
(iii) It was not recognized, in time, that the stabilizer trim wheel for the B737 Max may no longer be
the reliable solution to stabilizer problems which it used to be in the past. The impeccable safety
record of parts of the B737 NG could not be extended to the new design for this particular part of
the B737 flight control technology, as the agent designs had different capabilities.
(iv) Even in the absence of MCAS there were grounds to re-evaluate the functionality of the manual
stabilizer trim wheel: which scenario’s for a stabilizer runaway exist, and is the manual use of
the trim wheel a sufficiently reliable option for solving the problems in these scenario’s. In other
words: for which problem scenarios are the trim wheel to be considered a backup option, and is
it sufficiently usable in those cases? This question must be understood in the context of currently
fashionable B737 Pilot training traditions and in the context of Pilot practice and experience as
in existence today.
END PROMISE
Many remarks are made on many websites on the functionality, the use, and the various design options
for trim control. Obtaining an overview of this topic is not so easy (see, for instance [36]). In some
airplane designs the FBW (fly by wire) system takes care of stabilizer trim, except perhaps just before
takeoff.
Promise 5.4 (MCAS functionality: a conceptual problem)
Authors to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
Explaining what MCAS promised to deliver in the first place is so difficult that we have found
no single text which explains in any detail how that may work?7 The best approximation we
can provide is the following:
7In another wording this question appears in a post written by Mark R. Jacobsen [30, 37] who states that MCAS used the
stabilizer and changing its position by means of its controls to make the pilot feel different forces on the yoke. If true the
mechanism is novel in civil aviation and the FAA should have been much more systematic about its approval.
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(i) During flight with flaps down and manual control (using the yoke buttons for stabilizer
trimming) it may be the case that the aircraft operates in an angle of attack at which
the pilot (having the B737 NG in mind) would expect the yoke to require more effort
to keep in place. By activating the stabilizer trim MCAS the creates an episode in
which operation of the motor moving the jackscrew has as aside effect that the pilot
experiences more counterforce on the yoke, thereby experiencing what would be felt
inside a B737 when operating at that same AOA.
(ii) This side effect makes the pilot experience similar to what would be experienced in
a B737 NG in corresponding conditions. (ii) As a second effect of MCAS activation
the stabilizer is trimmed and the aircraft is made to turn nose-down, which may be
supposed to reduce the angle of attack more quickly then the pilot would achieved by
reacting as used in a B737: choosing between or combining elevator up, and addi-
tional stabilizer trim.
(iii) We found no explanation for why MCAS is only supposed to be active when auto-pilot
is off and flaps are down. We assume that, in auto-pilot mode, there is no need to make
sure that pilot experience is the same as when operating a B737. In other words: the
autopilot must deal with the same aerodynamic conditions and anomalies, which turns
out to be entirely possible, and for that there is no need to introduce drastic ‘external’
interventions of stabilizer trimming in excess of what the auto-pilot as inherited from
the B737 NG design would do.
END PROMISE
6 The role of transparency
In a perfect world there would be perfect information—but, in most cases, we have only partial in-
formation. Without perfect information, logical reasoning is almost impotent, but a reasoning based
on promises can offer plausible outcomes that may be assessed on the basis of any observer’s context.
Clearly, the more information one has about the interior workings of agents, the easier it is to assess their
promised claims. We mention only, only briefly and in passing, the contemporary tendency to ‘openness’
to public scrutiny, especially in the software world. The so-called Open Source Software movement is
one example where transparency has been claimed to lead to quality improvements, by virtue of having
‘many eyes’ look over the details. There is no such openness in flight systems, so we are reduced to
trusting low resolution promises and making inferences about their veracity. The freedom to report (or
transparency) of the press, who report issues, is another case where onlookers have to rely on the fidelity
of the intermediaries who bring us the information. Promise Theory makes it clear that one has no a pri-
ori reason to trust relayed information, as it can be distorted intentionally or unintentionally. A certain
level of openness therefore builds trust. Unfortunately, neither transparency nor ‘many eyes’ are a guar-
antee of truth or even of intent to act in good faith. We know that agents can be deceived, even with the
best of intentions, and that saboteurs can intentionally seek to deceive. It would be interesting to study
the role of transparency, and minimum information requirements, in determining successful models for
forensic investigation. That goes far beyond our goals here.
7 Concluding remarks
The litany of promises above describes a public discussion about the crash episodes of the Boeing 737
Max. This is to be distinguished from a technical analysis based on privileged information about the
design. As such, our discussion is more in line with what might be discussed in a court of law than in a
technical fault-finding analysis—it involves some hearsay and some innuendo, as is the case in all public
assessments. The relationship between these two viewpoints is not always acknowledged, but seems to
be relevant.
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We have laid out the assessable viewpoints of the various agents, with the sources and recipients
labelled clearly. From this, readers can assess the intentions, each from their own perspectives—this
is one of the values of a Promise Theory approach. To some extent, such public discourse inevitably
becomes a matter of ‘he said, she said’, and this presents a challenge to onlookers. Nevertheless, it is
society’s responsibility to mete justice in such cases, so we must take on that challenge.
Promises and impositions also encompass threats as a special case (see [38]). In the context of the
B737 Max accidents we have noticed a remarkably prominent occurrence of threats, (quite apart from the
predictable threat that relatives of victims of the accidents would sue Boeing). Indeed Southwest Airlines
expressed its being unimpressed by the relevance of B737 Max specific simulator training (see [39,40]),
and promised to claim 1 million USD per B737 Max purchased, if specific simulator training would
turn out to be needed. Boeing accepted this threat and promised the payments, in the case that it would
(after all, and against its original intentions) prescribe simulator training for the B737 Max [41]. With
aircraft getting more complex, providing extensive simulator training for large numbers of pilots could
be a positive side-effect, and might become a form of system testing, which is likely to become more
relevant and expensive. The promise of automation is normally that it reduces costs, or improves the
human condition. In this case, a half-hearted attempt at automation seems to have backfired.
From our superficial presentation, constrained by brevity, the benefits of PT might not be wholly
apparent, and may strike the reader as just another approach to informal logic. That may be true, but
rather than a focus on evidence and truth PT suggest a focus on the dynamics of trust and the impact
which promising has on the latter. A promise body may just as well be a lie (see [42]) as it may be a
mathematical theorem. One may reject our use of the word promise in which case we refer to [43] for
the idea that a “valid” PT may allow some deviation of the common understanding of its keywords in
order to arrive at so-called “good concepts”. For a justification of the terminology and its use we refer
to [14] and the references cited therein, as well as to [44, 45].
We have not discussed assessments of promises which have not been kept. In an early stage Boeing
pointed at pilot errors as explanatory for the incidents (which is the default strategy for blame in most
accidents), and such remarks may be construed as a promise which has not been kept and which invites
a decrease in many observers’ trust in Boeing. In a later stage the Boeing CEO stated that Boeing de-
signers did not miss any details (or fail to spot gaps) in their designs; this may construed as a promise
that is probably not going to be kept. Benno Baksteen’s comments above, rendered as our promise 3.9
are of interest in this regard. Baksteen has been a (very) public representative of pilots in The Nether-
lands for many years. He took sides with Boeing engineers and thereby unavoidably against the (now
dead) pilot teams in his initial reaction. This demonstrated a remarkable ‘reverse default loyalty’ to his
constituents. Perhaps this indicates the formidable reputation of safety for the B737 design line, and
reinforces promise 5.2 item (i).
We maintain that MCAS is a proprietary (and closed source) software component, which imple-
ments an algorithm, the MCAS algorithm to which the DO178c standard has been applied to obtain the
software component from a proposed description of the algorithm. To the general public, this might
seem straightforward. The notion of an algorithm is somewhat ambiguous, however, and many different
definitions have been given. We understand an algorithm to be a series of steps for solving a class of
problems, which can be documented as a finite sequence of instructions. This definition is consistent with
definitions as given in [46,47], but it provides some additional detail8. Without interior details of the de-
sign process, these promises are rather meaningless—which also renders the notion of design standards
somewhat meaningless, without a formal certificate of compliance. Importantly, in the current popular
use of the word, ‘algorithm’ refers to a software component in such a manner that the component can be
made the subject of public debate. In other words by speaking of an algorithm one can make reference
to a certain software component without claiming to know or to understand its technical details. In this
way the ubiquitous use of ‘algorithm’ deviates from its conventional use in computer science where, in
practice, algorithm invariably refers to a fairly detailed pseudo-code which can be turned in a straightfor-
ward manner into a computer language (e.g. Python), or into whatever general purpose program notation
8For the notion of an instruction sequence and the consequences of requiring finiteness thereof we refer to [48].
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one may prefer. The use of the term algorithm, in the public debate, is more vague however, and the
reader is expected to be aware of that state of affairs. In the case of aircraft control, and in particular
also in the case of FBW (fly by wire) technology it is common to speak of flight laws as the underlying
concepts from which software components are being derived. It seems appropriate to use ‘flight control
algorithm’ as an alternative for ‘flight laws’ when discussing software components such as MCAS in the
public domain.
A more thorough approach to mapping out the roles of all involved agents, their capabilities, and their
resulting fidelity in keeping all their design promises as part of a total system is one possible future use for
Promise Theory’s simple methodology. What exists today seems muddled in checklist semantics without
a clear integrated picture of the system on all scales. The deliberations, presented here, surrounding
MCAS might also profit from contact with the larger discussion of Meaningful Human Control (see
e.g. [15] and [17]), which has become prominent in the theory of (semi)autonomous systems, including
weapons as well as in the theory and practice of (semi)autonomous driving.
In closing, we note that assessments rooted in personal ideology cannot easily be avoided in pub-
lic discourse—not merely by making use of Promise Theory. We have adopted the viewpoint that
promise 3.3 made from Boeing (that MCAS is not an anti-stall system) is central to our considera-
tions, and this is crucial. Were Boeing to admit that this promise cannot be kept—and therefore was not
kept, a significant loss of trust in Boeing could result, and a consequential loss of trust in the future of
the B737 so large that it might in fact bring down the whole B737 Max project. Portraying MCAS as
an anti-stall system by default, as in many contributions to the subject (see, for example, [49], and in
the otherwise outstandingly informative [23]), runs against the substance of promise 3.3. Reference [50]
proposes speaking of ‘association’ if two notions are identified at some stage, and may be unidentified
at a later stage. Viewing MCAS as an anti-stall system may be considered such a temporary association,
to be disassociated if evidence arises that MCAS is not an anti-stall system. However, there is a key
difference between the intent to behave in a certain way and an emergent and effective behaviour that
seems to do the trick in the moment. Promise Theoretically we should likely oppose the validity of emer-
gence, because public safety and legal assurances are supposed to be based on good intent. We consider
promise 3.3 to be crucial in the analysis of the Boeing 737 Max accidents.
Finally, in [51] it is argued that the certification process, conducted by the FAA is in its current form,
is unable to detect some structural risks and that an overhaul of the certification system is needed in such
a manner as to be more focused on risk analysis. Without further comment, we add that we do not believe
this to be the case: a checklist style certification process, which merely enumerates promises at the same
level, might well have discovered a few more relevant weaknesses of the MCAS software component
(including software certification promise lists), but more likely the current certification methods need
a more systematic incorporation into all levels of engineering—including the relatively new software
development process.
References
[1] M. Burgess, A Treatise On Systems Volume II: Intentional Systems With Faults, Errors, And Flaws.
χtAxis Press, 2017-2019.
[2] IEEE, “Standard classification for software anomalies, 1044 wg,” 1992-2006.
[3] J. Allspaw, “Blameless postmortems and a just culture.” Etsy blog, 2012.
[4] J. Allspaw, “Trade-offs under pressure:heuristics and observations of teams resolving internet ser-
vice outages,” Master’s thesis, Lund University, 2015.
[5] J. Reed, “On the structure and use of post-incident analysis artifacts in software development and
operations,” Master’s thesis, Lund University, 2018.
[6] J. Reason, Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1990.
17
[7] D. Do¨rner, The Logic of Failure. New York: Basic Books, 1996.
[8] E. Hollnagel, D. Woods, and N. Leveson, eds., Resilience Engineering. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing,
2006.
[9] S. Dekker, Drift Into Failure. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2011.
[10] M. Burgess, In Search of Certainty: the science of our information infrastructure. χtaxis Press,
2013.
[11] M. Burgess, A Treatise On Systems Volume I: Analytical Description Of Human-Information Net-
works. χtAxis Press, 2003,2017-2019.
[12] M. Li, “Another self-driving car accident, another ai development lesson,” Towards Data Science,
2019.
[13] A. Hawkins, “The worlds first robot car death was the result of human error and it can happen
again,” The Verge, 2019.
[14] J. Bergstra and M. Burgess, Promise Theory: Principles and Applications. χt Axis Press, 2019.
[15] F. S. de Sio and J. van den Hoven, “Meaningful human control over autonomous sys-
tems: a philosophical acount,” Frontiers in Robotics and AI, vol. 5, no. 15, 2018.
https://doe.org/10.3389/frobt.2018.00015.
[16] P. Elands, A. Huizing, L. Kester, M. Peeters, and S. Oggero, “Governing ethical and effective
behaviour of intelligent systems,” Militaire Spectator, vol. 188, no. 6, pp. 303–313, 2019.
[17] F. Slijper, A. Beck, D. Kayser, and M. Beenes, “Don’t be evil. a survey of the tech sector’s stand on
lethal autonomous weapons.” PAX for peace website, August 2019.
[18] J. Bergstra and M. Burgess, Promise Theory: Money, Ownership, and Agency. χt Axis Press, 2019.
[19] M. Burgess, “A site configuration engine,” Computing systems (MIT Press: Cambridge MA), vol. 8,
p. 309, 1995.
[20] M. Burgess and R. Ralston, “Distributed resource administration using CFEngine,” Software prac-
tice and experience, vol. 27, p. 1083, 1997.
[21] M. Burgess, “Automated system administration with feedback regulation,” Software practice and
experience, vol. 28, p. 1519, 1998.
[22] M. Burgess, “On the theory of system administration,” Science of Computer Programming, vol. 49,
p. 1, 2003.
[23] W. B. Wendel, “Technological solutions to human error and how they can kill you: understanding
the Boeing 737-max products liability litigation,” Tech. Rep. 19-47, Cornell Law School research
paper, 2019.
[24] L. Hutton and A. Rutkowski, “‘lessons must be learned’—but are they?,” Tech. Rep. 43661,
Kingston University, 2019.
[25] K. Kimbler and L. Bouma, eds., Feature Interactions in Telecommunications and Software Systems
V. IOS Press, 1989.
[26] S. Baker, “This timeline shows exactly what happened on board the Lion Air Boeing 737 max that
crashed in less than 13 minutes, killing 189 people,” Business Insider, 2019.
[27] A. Dershowitz, “Considerations for aircraft trim control.” Exponent, 2019.
18
[28] D. Kaminski-Morrow, “Boeing’s mcas test did not simulate other cockpit effects,” Flight Global,
2019.
[29] D. Slotnick, “New report reveals why boeings 737 max has taken so long to return to service,”
Business Insider, 2019.
[30] Wikipedia, “Maneuvering characteristics augmentation system.” Wikipedia website, December
2019.
[31] B. Baksteen, “’Boeings aan de grond houden is voorbarig’,” BNR News podcast, 2019.
[32] R. Nader, “Boeing may suspend 737 max, but consumer advocate Ralph Nader wants a total recall
of deadly planes.” Democracy Now, December 2019.
[33] P. Ladkin, “IEEE spectrum on possible software involvement in two recent airliner crashes,” The
Abnormal Distribution, 2019.
[34] R. Cutler, “Ten reasons to defer Boeing 737 max recertification,” tech. rep., 2019.
[35] F. Pothon, “Do 178c/ed-12c versus do 178b/ed-12b–changes and improvements.”
[36] Various, “What are the reasons to evolve from trim tabs to moving the entire surface (e.g. stabi-
lizer)?.” Stack Exchange (Aviation).
[37] M. Jacobsen, “What’s wrong with Boeing?,” Defense One, 2019.
[38] D. Baldwin The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 71–78, 1971.
[39] D. Campbell, “The 737 built Southwest, and the 737 max could be its undoing,” The Verge, 2019.
[40] E. Hoopfer, “Southwest doesn’t think 737 max simulator time is necessary for pilots,” Dallas Busi-
ness Journal, 2019.
[41] D. Shepardson and T. Rucinski, “U.s. lawmakers question Boeing’s $1 mln rebate clause for south-
west 737 max orders,” Reuters, 2019.
[42] J. E. Mahon, “The definition of lying and deception..” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2016. Winter edition.
[43] J. Gerring, “What makes a concept good? a critical framework for understanding concept formation
in the social sciences,” Polity, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 357–393, 1999.
[44] M. Burgess, “Spacetimes with semantics (i): Notes on theory and formalism,”
http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.5563, 2014.
[45] M. Burgess, Thinking in Promises: Designing Systems for Cooperation. O’Reilly Media, 2015.
[46] T. Corman, C. Leiserson, R. Rivest, and C. Stein., Introduction to algorithms. McGraw-Hill, 2002.
[47] T. Corman, C. Leiserson, R. Rivest, and C. Stein., Introduction to algorithms, Third edition.
McGraw-Hill, 2009.
[48] J. Bergstra and C. Middelburg, Instruction Sequences for Computer Science. Atlantis Publishing,
2012.
[49] F. Pothon, “Do-178c/ed-12cversusdo-178b/ed-12b: Changes and improvements,” tech. rep., ACG
Solutions, 2012.
19
[50] J. Nicaud, D. Bouhineau, and J. Gelis, “Syntax and semantics in algebra,” in Proc. 12th ICMI
Study Conference, The University of Melbourne, HAL archives-ouvertes, 2001. https://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/hal-00962023/document.
[51] T. Sgobba, “B-737 max and the crash of the regulatory system,” Journal of Space Safety Engineer-
ing, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 299–303, 2019.
20
